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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business. It 
argues for a multi-level theory based on classical internalisation theory. The theory 
extends the ‘systems approach’ to the multinational enterprise in which modular 
activities, such as production, marketing and R&D, are linked by flows of semi-
processed products and proprietary knowledge. It is shown how this theory can be 
extended from the firm level to the industry level in order to analyse inter-firm co-
operation and rivalry. The theory can be extended to higher levels (e.g. the global 
economy) and lower levels (e.g. personal relationships within plants and offices). 
 
(99 words)  
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The Theory of International Business: The Role of Economic Models 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business (IB) 
theory. Economic modelling was commonplace in the 1970s, became unusual in the 
1990s, and was controversial by 2000. There are eminent IB scholars today who deny 
the usefulness of formal economic models in IB. 
 
This is odd. Economic theory addresses existential issues in IB. Why do firms become 
multinational? Why are some firms multinational and others not? Why did the 
number and the size of multinationals (MNEs) increase in the 1950s? Why did ‘new 
forms’ of MNE emerge in the 1980s and 1990s? Economic theory provides a set of 
general principles that addresses these issues. 
 
MNEs are clearly economic in terms of the functions they perform, e.g. production, 
investment and trade. They employ labour, borrow capital and have shareholders who 
bear business risks. They are not purely economic, of course. Their managers and 
workers socialise amongst themselves. They are multi-cultural organisations, but they 
are not the only organisations of this type. The United Nations, the European Union 
and other inter-governmental organisations are multi-cultural too. No-one argues that 
political organisations should be analysed without reference to politics, so why should 
MNEs be analysed without reference to economics? MNEs may well be multicultural, 
but that is not their defining characteristic. 
 
Economic analysis has been crowded out of leading IB journals by studies of cross-
cultural organisation. These studies examine issues that are not specific to MNEs; 
they do not explain why MNEs exist, which markets they serve and where they 
produce. They typically ignore the fact that MNEs are profit-driven, subject to 
competitive pressures, and must be efficient in order to survive. 
 
Two main factors explain the shift away from economics: economic theory is 
perceived as highly technical and of little practical relevance, while business strategy 
is seen as offering a more relevant non-technical substitute.  
 
Critics of economics claim that economic theory has become a mere collection of 
mathematical models whose assumptions are patently absurd. Mathematics is 
employed, it is said, not for its practical utility, but to create a pseudo-scientific image 
and to confer spurious authority. Excessive reliance on mathematics, the critics claim, 
renders economic theory unintelligible to students and irrelevant to practising 
managers. 
 
Distaste for economics in general, and mathematics in particular, has led to low 
citations of economic papers. Some journal editors avoid publishing economics 
papers because impact factors, and hence rankings, may be lowered; this in turn 
discourages economic research in IB. 
 
The ‘other side of the coin’ is the rise of business strategy. It is widely believed that 
the most important aspects of economic theory have been incorporated into theories 
of business strategy. There is an element of truth in this. Porter’s (1980) seminal work 
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on Competitive Strategy took the basic principles of industrial organisation theory and 
presented them, not from the standpoint of government regulation, but from a 
boardroom perspective. There is a problem, however. Porter over-simplified the 
economic theory of industrial organisation. He dropped the industry perspective, 
which was fundamental to the theory, and replaced it with the firm perspective. But 
he failed to alert his readers to what he had done. He coined new terms, such as ‘value 
chain’, for existing concepts, such multi-stage production and (more controversially) 
substituted ‘competitive advantage’ for monopoly power. By inventing new jargon, 
and failing to acknowledge some of his sources, Porter cut off his readers from the 
intellectual tradition on which he himself relied. 
 
In the 1980s a new generation of scholars, teaching strategy in business schools, 
began to theorise using Porter’s concepts, unaware that his over-simplified framework 
was inadequate for rigorous theory development. The most obvious symptom of the 
failure of the strategy literature is the confusion that now prevails on theoretical 
issues. Over-simplification has destroyed much of the legacy of earlier theory. 
  
If IB theory is to progress, future developments need to be based on more secure 
foundations than strategy. It is necessary to go ‘back to basics’. This involves  
stripping away the superfluous concepts that have proliferated in IB theory over the 
past twenty years. The first step in theory development must be to recover the 
fundamental principles on which IB theory was originally based. This paper sets out 
these principles and outlines a research agenda that builds upon them. 
 
2. Back to basics: the role of theory 
 
A good way to begin is with the question ‘Why is theory so important, and what 
distinguishes a good theory from a bad one?’. A good theory affords a unified 
explanation of a range of different phenomena concerning a given topic. Theory 
provides economy of thought. It summarises a mass of detail by postulating a simple 
set of relationships that fits all (or most) of the facts. 
 
Good theory is logically consistent. It deduces multiple hypotheses from the same set 
of core assumptions. Good theory usually involves contingency: it explains not only 
what is normal, but why different outcomes emerge under different circumstances. 
Under conditions A the outcome X is observed, and under conditions B outcome Y is 
observed instead. It may be said that A causes X, and B causes Y, especially if X and Y 
appear after A and B. In economic theory outcomes are typically rational responses to 
causal factors, i.e. X is the best response to A and Y the best response to B. 
 
Economic theory is highly contingent. Because resources are scarce, trade-offs are 
common, and so economic behaviour adapts as resources change. Unlike strategy, 
which often purports to identify the ‘one best way’ of doing things, economics shows 
that adaptation is usually the best strategy.  
 
It is often said that a good theory is a simple theory (Morgan, 2012). But there is a 
trade-off. A simple theory is often unrealistic. IB is an inherently complex subject. It 
involves the interplay of location and ownership within a global system of production. 
Everything is connected to everything else in the global economy and a good theory 
will recognise this. Good theory clarifies the nature of these interdependencies; it does 
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not just assume them away. Good theory is more realistic than simple theory; it 
reflects the genuine complexity of the system and clarifies the nature of the inter-
dependencies that hold it together. Good theory is not only about simplicity, but about 
clarity of thinking too. 
 
While interdependency and contingency increase the complexity of economic theory, 
they enhance realism and therefore explanatory power. It is better to have a single 
contingent theory that explains a range of phenomena with clarity than a portfolio of 
simple theories that each explain a different phenomenon. It is easier to understand a 
general theory based on a single set of assumptions than a collection of special 
theories based on different assumptions that cannot be reconciled with each other. 
This paper therefore focuses on general theories rather than specific theories of 
specific phenomena.  
 
 
3. Origins of modern IB theory 
 
3.1. The failure of neoclassical theory 
 
IB theory did not emerge simply because someone thought that it would be a good 
idea. It emerged because orthodox theory failed. It could not account for the rise of 
MNEs in the post-1945 period. In particular, it could not explain the dramatic growth 
in the number and size of MNEs, why they were mainly headquartered in the US and 
why they mainly invested Europe. Furthermore, it could not explain why their 
investments were concentrated in technology–intensive and marketing–intensive 
industries.  
 
Mainstream ‘neoclassical’ economists regarded foreign direct investment (FDI) 
simply as a form of international capital flow (McDougall, 1960, Kemp, 1971). 
Capital was assumed to be homogeneous, and no distinction was drawn between 
direct investment (giving control of resources through a majority equity stake) and 
indirect or portfolio investment (involving minority equity stakes and bonds). 
 
Neoclassical theory predicted that 
 at any given time there would be a net flow of investment from low-profit 
countries to high-profit countries; 
 this flow would be transitory; it would cease once international capital stocks 
had adjusted so that profits rates were equalised across countries; 
 since capital was homogeneous, flows would be the same irrespective of 
industries; and 
 there would be no ‘cross-hauling’; i.e. capital would only flow in one direction 
at the same time. 
 
This conflicted with just about everything that was known about FDI at the time 
(Dunning, 1958): 
 it flowed from a high-profit country ,the US, to low-profit countries in Europe; 
 it was persistent and growing; 
 it was industry-specific; and 
 it flowed in both directions at once.  
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The abject failure of neoclassical theory is summarised in Table 1. The key facts are 
shown in the left-hand column. The neoclassical predictions are shown in the middle 
column, and the predictions of modern IB theory in the right-hand column. IB theory 
provided a simple, direct and intuitively satisfying explanation for everything that 
neoclassical theory failed to explain. 
 
3.2. Three key questions 
 
The basic outline of IB theory was established over the period 1960-76. Three key 
questions were identified, as shown in the left-hand column of Table 2. The answers 
given are shown in the middle column and the type of theory from which the answers 
were derived appears in the right-hand column. 
 
 Location of production. Why would US firms produce in Europe rather than 
the US? Answer: The post-war ‘dollar shortage’ made US labour expensive 
relative to European labour, while high-tariffs encouraged European 
production in order to ‘jump the European tariff wall’. 
 
 Ownership of production. Politicians were mystified by how US firms 
achieved higher productivity than European firms when employing European 
workers. Surely they must have suffered from lack of local knowledge? 
Explanation: US firms possessed a countervailing advantage in superior 
technology, labour management and/or marketing methods, which 
compensated for their lack of specific local knowledge. 
 
 Internalisation advantage. Why not have the best of both worlds, by 
combining the general knowledge of the US firm with the local knowledge of 
a European firm using a license agreement in which a European firm produced 
the US product for the European market using US technology? Answer: There 
must be some obstacle to licensing which makes it more efficient to internalise 
the transfer of knowledge from the US to Europe within the US firm.   
 
The first two question concerning location and ownership were addressed by the 
Hymer-Kindleberger (HK) theory (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969). This theory 
appealed to trade theory for its explanation of location, and to monopoly theory for its 
explanation of the firm’s advantage. The final question concerning licensing was 
addressed using internalisation theory, as explained below.   
 
Two approaches: eclectic theory and internalisation theory 
 
There were two different responses to this early success of IB theory. 
 
 A special theory of IB was all that was required, and that had already been 
developed. It explained the special facts that neoclassical theory could not 
explain.  The HK theory was perfectly sound, and internalisation was just an 
‘add-on’. Adding internalisation created the ‘eclectic theory’ (Dunning, 1977). 
The key facts could be explained terms of three advantages, corresponding to 
the three questions listed in the table; location, ownership and internalisation. 
It was stated, rather rashly, that these advantages together were necessary and 
sufficient for FDI. 
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 The second response was that, since neoclassical economics claimed to be a 
general theory, but could not explain IB, it must be fundamentally flawed, and 
therefore needed to be replaced. A new general theory was required to restore 
the credibility of economics. It would be a general theory of the firm in space; 
the MNE would emerge quite naturally under specific conditions, so IB would 
figure as a special case (Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
 
Advocates of the first approach regarded the second approach as extravagant, and 
much of its content superfluous. Advocates of the second approach claimed that they 
could achieve much more than simply explaining some specific facts: their approach 
provided a general framework within which many different types of firm, and many 
different forms of firm behaviour, could be understood. By embedding specific 
explanations within a wider framework, greater analytical clarity would be achieved. 
This second approach led to classic internalisation theory.  
 
4. Classic internalisation theory 
 
4.1. The multi-plant firm  
 
Neoclassical theory confused two fundamental concepts: the plant and the firm. 
Internalisation theory, on the other hand, drew a key distinction between them. A 
plant was a physical facility; it could be a factory, R&D laboratory, warehouse, office 
or shop. The firm, by contrast, was an institution. It owned the product produced in its 
facilities. The firm was a legal instrument through which shareholders combined their 
capitals to produce an output that was sold for profit. The firm was a fictional person, 
recognised in law, that acted as a nexus of contracts between workers, shareholders, 
suppliers and customers. It added value by intermediating between them. 
 
Neoclassical economics implicitly assumed that firms were single plant firms, and 
therefore operated in a single country. This reflected reality at the end of the 
nineteenth century, at the time when the theory was developed. But even then multi-
plant firms were becoming more common, although most were only multi-regional 
(e.g. retail chain stores). 
 
A multi-plant firm operates several plants in different locations, and if the plants are 
in different countries then the firm becomes an MNE. National borders are often 
arbitrary; e.g. drawn up to consolidate territory gained or lost through war. 
Internalisation theorists believed that once the economic logic of the multi-plant firm 
was established it would be easy to account for the MNE on the basis of the 
irrationality of national borders. Multi-plant firms would naturally be multinational if 
the ‘costs of doing business abroad’ (or the ‘liability of foreignness’ in modern 
terminology) were not too high. 
 
4.2. The legacy of Ronald Coase 
 
The development of internalisation theory was inspired by the work of Ronald Coase 
(1937), who was in turn inspired by the work of his mentor Lionel Robbins (Casson, 
2014). Coase’s analysis  of ‘the nature of the firm’ was embedded within a more 
general question of what determines the balance between ‘planning’ and ‘prices’ in 
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the allocation of resources within a national economy. This was a topic of intense 
ideological debate in the 1930s. 
 
Coase noted that the state is not the only institution that undertakes planning; firms 
also plan. But unlike the state, which asserts its authority to plan, firms only plan by 
consent; the shareholders must agree to invest, the workers must agree to be 
employed, and the customers must agree to buy the product. Furthermore, the state 
must be willing to recognise firms as legal entities. 
 
Firms plan by consent, Coase argues, because markets are imperfect, and so under 
certain circumstances it pays to replace them with firms. The more imperfect are 
markets, the greater the benefits of firms. But planning systems are imperfect too, so 
the boundaries of a firm are set where the marginal benefit of planning (i.e. 
internalisation) is equal to the marginal benefit of using prices (i.e. arm’s length 
contracts).  
 
4.3. Modular systems 
 
Internalisation theorists applied this idea to inter-plant coordination. They took a 
modular view of production. Production may involve a set of different activities, each 
carried out in a different plant. Modularisation may be vertical, with upstream 
production feeding into downstream production, or horizontal, where different plants 
perform the same activity at different locations. 
 
Vertical modularisation takes two main forms. The first involves a flow of semi-
processed product through a multi-stage production system and the second involves a 
flow of knowledge between R&D and production. The first flow typically involves 
raw materials and components, while knowledge flow may involve only documents. 
 
Knowledge is a public good; it can be shared by different plants. It is usually more 
economic for two plants to share the same knowledge rather than to independently 
generate the same knowledge for themselves. 
 Where different plants in different locations share the same knowledge 
vertical modularisation involving R&D is linked to horizontal modularisation 
involving production. 
 Where the knowledge is shared by different plants at different stages of 
production two types of vertical modularisation are involved: one involves the 
flow of knowledge to the plants and the other involves the flow of semi-
processed product between the plants.  
 
Each form of modularisation has its own coordination requirements. Multi-plant firms 
arise when the internalisation of coordination brings different plants under common 
ownership and control. Internalisation theory embraces all forms of modularisation. 
Some writers, however, emphasise vertical modularisation involving knowledge to 
the exclusion of everything else; this over-simplifies the theory and weakens its 
explanatory power.  
 
4.4. Specific applications of Coase: theories of vertical and horizontal integration. 
 
The strength of Coase’s work is its high level of generality. It has two main 
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weaknesses, however. 
 
 Lack of practical applications. Coase’s main example of internalisation 
involves intra-plant coordination involving teams; the productivity of each 
team member depends on the productivity of others, and so the employer 
directs each worker while they perform their tasks (see also Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). There is no analysis of inter-plant coordination, as discussed 
above. There is certainly no discussion of the internalisation of knowledge; 
indeed, Coase specifically claims that knowledge cannot be appropriated, and 
that attempts by firms to uphold intellectual property are futile. 
 
 Vagueness about the nature of market costs. Coase refers mainly to the costs 
of ‘discovering prices’. Today it is recognised that markets incur several 
different types of cost: 
 Search costs: identifying potential trading partners and making contact 
with them; 
 Specification costs: specifying product characteristics; 
 Negotiation costs: bargaining over price and other terms of contract; 
 Administrative costs: coordinating time and place of delivery; and 
 Enforcement costs: Deterring default on product quality or payment with 
the threat of prosecution or reprisal. 
 
Coase seems to refer to search costs, while today most emphasis is placed on 
enforcement costs.   
 
4.5. Vertical integration in production 
 
For practical insights into internalisation it is necessary to consult the literature on 
vertical and horizontal integration.  
 
The theory of vertical integration focuses on intermediate product flow between 
upstream and downstream plants. ‘Integrated’ plants have a common owner and so 
internalise the intermediate product market between them. Table 3 summarises key 
literature, some of which pre-dates Coase. 
 
A popular explanation for vertical integration in manufacturing was the potential to 
rationalise inventory; a point later refined by Arrow (1975), who identified missing 
contingent forward markets as a motive for internalisation. Another explanation 
emphasised that monopoly at any stage of production distorts relative prices at 
adjacent stages unless the distortion is removed by internalisation (Warren-Boulton, 
1978). Williamson (1975; 1985) offered two explanations for vertical integration; 
firstly that it reduces the costs of repeated contracting, and secondly (following Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978) that it mitigated bargaining problems when upstream 
and downstream plants were locked into each other (e.g. by co-location or 
technological complementarity). IB theory added yet another factor: improved quality 
control; quality control is easier when the downstream firm owns its own source of 
supply (Casson, 1987).  
 
Today vertical integration plays a prominent role in analysing resource-seeking 
MNEs that integrate backwards into overseas mining or agriculture.  
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4.6. Horizontal integration in production 
 
Horizontal integration occurs where two or more plants at the same stage of 
production are owned by the same firm; it is key to the standard analysis of the 
market-seeking MNE. Early literature associated horizontal integration with 
monopoly power If a customer typically visits two different stores in two different 
towns and buys from the cheapest, and a chain store then takes over the independents 
or drives them out of business, the customer’s choice is limited and competition is 
suppressed. Monopoly power drives up the price and rewards the chain store with 
monopoly profit. 
 
The arm’s length equivalent of horizontal integration is the cartel (Casson, 1985). A 
cartel is an agreement between firms to maintain prices above their competitive level. 
International cartels in basic commodities were common in the inter-war period (e.g. 
in oil, chemicals and metals). Cartel agreements are difficult to enforce, however, 
because covert price-cutting is easy. Enforcement is particularly difficult when cartels 
are opposed by governments, because they cannot then be enforced by law. 
Government support was forthcoming in the inter-war period because, with over-
capacity in basic industries, international competition damaged the profits of ‘national 
champion’ firms, but post-war US hegemony led to cartels becoming illegal. 
 
4.7. Vertical and horizontal integration applied to knowledge 
 
The introduction of proprietary knowledge was a key innovation of modern IB theory. 
(Hymer, 1976; Buckley and Casson, 1976). Knowledge encompasses technology, 
brands, and other kinds of specialised know-how. In neoclassical theory knowledge 
was usually assumed to be a free good, equally accessible to all at zero cost. In IB 
theory knowledge is a public good (see above), but it is not a free good. 
 
In neoclassical theory the stock of knowledge was usually taken as given. Little 
attention was paid to the incentive to produce it. In IB theory, however, knowledge 
production plays a central role. The focus is on privately-funded R&D undertaken by 
firms. 
 
R&D incurs large sunk costs which must be recovered from subsequent profits. 
Monopoly power is the key to profit.  Imitation creates competition, undermining 
profits and so deterring R&D.  Patents and other intellectual property rights (IPR) are 
crucial in appropriating profit, but IPR can be costly to enforce.  
 
Secrecy is an alternative to patenting when IPR is weak. Secrecy favours 
internalisation because of the ‘buyer uncertainty’ problem (Vaitsos, 1974, Casson, 
1979). A potential licensee may be unsure about the quality of the secrets they are 
offered; they could be unreliable or they could be things that they already know. This 
a variant of the quality assurance problem encountered in ordinary commodity 
markets (see above). 
 
Where different licensees are used in different countries, protecting monopoly profits 
requires a licensee’s cartel. If the final product is cheap to transport then licensees can 
easily invade each other territories, dissipating monopoly profits though competition 
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(Casson, 1985). The greater the problems of organising a licensee’s cartel, the greater 
are the advantages of internalising all production. 
  
The same knowledge may also be used at different stages of production. If two 
adjacent stages of production draw upon the same source of R&D then internalisation 
of knowledge at each stage leads automatically to vertical integration in production. 
This applies whether or not the vertical integration has an international dimension. 
This point was overlooked in early statements of Williamson’s (1975) influential 
theory of vertical integration. A great deal of ingenuity has gone into contriving 
explanations of domestic vertical integration in terms of opportunism and hostage-
taking when a simple explanation based on shared use of the same proprietary 
knowledge would have been more convincing. 
 
4.8. Origins of classic internalisation theory: summary 
 
Classic internalisation theory is a reconstruction of neoclassical theory which rejects 
several key assumptions of the theory. Two of the rejected assumptions are 
fundamental: 
      
 Markets work perfectly 
 Knowledge is free to all 
Two others were implicit assumptions that slipped in unchallenged: 
 Each firm owns just a single plant 
 FDI involves a flow of homogeneous capital 
These assumptions were replaced by alternatives that are more relevant and realistic. 
Simply dropping objectionable assumptions and not replacing them would weaken the 
explanatory power of the theory. The new assumptions are:  
 Markets are costly; these costs depend on product characteristics and other 
observable factors. 
 Knowledge is often proprietary. 
 The multi-plant firm represents the general type of firm and the single-plant 
firm of neoclassical theory is just a special case where the number of plants is 
one. 
 FDI involves a flow of heterogeneous knowledge. Direct investment confers 
control of this knowledge. 
In classic internalisation theory:  
 Individuals are rational, though not perfectly informed. They seek out 
opportunities for mutual benefit whenever possible. Where competition is 
intense the outcome of negotiations approximates to a perfect market outcome 
but in other cases it does not. Monopoly outcomes are common and, when 
there is reliance on privately-funded R&D, they may even be desirable. 
 While the single plant firms may be the statistical norm, out-numbering other 
types of plant, the multi-plant firm represents the general case. The MNE is an 
important special case of the multi-plant firm. 
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 Knowledge is more important than capital. Knowledge is fundamentally 
heterogeneous, unlike financial capital, such as bonds, which are relatively 
homogeneous. This means that every firm exploiting proprietary knowledge is 
different from every other firm that does the same and needs to be treated as 
such. 
Some assumptions of neoclassical theory are retained by classical internalisation 
theory. The most important of these is profit-maximisation. Contrary to popular 
opinion, profit-maximisation does not imply selfishness. When shareholders finance a 
firm they share a common purpose to make as much profit as possible subject to the 
law. Their social and ethical concerns are reflected in the way they choose to spend 
their share of the profits, and the way they vote on government policies to regulate 
firms. People with a conscience (e.g. virtuous pensioners) can rightfully own shares in 
profit-maximising firms that follow laws designed to protect the public interest. In a 
competitive economy firms that fail to maximise profit are unlikely to survive and so 
any noble aims they profess that are at variance with profit will not be realised. 
5. The systems view 
 
5.1. Linkages between production, marketing and R&D 
 
The analysis of vertical and horizontal integration involving R&D and production is 
illustrated schematically in Figure 1 (see Buckley and Casson, 1998a, 1998b). An 
R&D laboratory (identified by a triangle) develops knowledge that is embodied in an 
innovative product supplied to customers in two different countries. Local marketing 
and distribution is identified as a modular downstream activity, which takes wholesale 
product as an input from upstream production and passes it on to final consumers. 
Both production and marketing are represented by boxes; product flow is represented 
by black lines, and knowledge flow by grey lines.  National boundaries are indicated 
by thin black lines; R&D can be located in either country. 
 
R&D and production can be located in either country. Marketing and distribution 
have to be located close to the market however. There are thus 2x2x2=8 location 
strategies (two for R&D location, two for production for country 1 and two for 
production for country 2). Under certain circumstances the number of options can be 
reduced. If cross-hauling the product is inefficient, for example, only three production 
options need to be considered: producing locally in each country, and exporting from 
either country. If economies of scale are significant it may be inefficient to replicate 
production in both countries, and then only two production locations options would be 
viable.  
 
Each linkage can be internal or external, apart from the link to the final customer, 
which is always external. For each location configuration, knowledge flow can be 
internal or external, with separate decisions made for production and marketing. If 
both production and marketing are internalised then product flow is internalised as 
well. If one is internalised and the other is not then product flow is external. With 
production internalised, franchising occurs, while with marketing internalised 
subcontracting occurs. If neither production nor marketing is internalised then the 
knowledge is licensed. It may be licensed to a single firm that integrates them both, or 
out-sourced to different firms, one of which is a subcontractor and the other a 
franchisee; this resembles the ‘putting out’ system commonly encountered in the 
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textile industry and in other multi-stage production systems. Altogether, therefore, 
there are five main ownership options that need to be considered for each market 
configuration. In principle separate decisions can be made for each market. There are 
thus 5x5=25 distinct ownership options for production and marketing. With 8 location 
options there are 8 x 25 = 200 options need to be considered altogether. 
 
5.2. Simple internalisation theory as a special case of the systems view 
 
In simple expositions of internalisation theory only three configurations are 
considered, namely exporting, licensing and FDI. So how are 200 options reduced to 
three? 
 
 The location of R&D is fixed; this halves the options to 100. By convention 
R&D is located in ‘home’ country which is country 1 
 The focus is on the ‘foreign’ market only (country 2). The ‘home’ country 
market (country 1) is served by internal local production. This reduces the 
locations of production options to two: export to country 2 from country 1 or 
produce in country 2. Ownership choice exists only for the foreign market; 
this reduces the ownership options to five, leaving 5 x 2 = 10 options 
altogether 
 In the foreign market the internalisation decision for marketing is the same as 
that for production; this reduces the number of ownership options to three. The 
total number of options is thereby reduced to six. 
 If production and marketing are both out-sourced they are licensed to an 
integrated licensee; this reduces the number of options to four 
 Exports from the home country to the foreign country are produced in a 
wholly-owned plant; this reduces the number of options to three. 
 
To appreciate the limitations of simplified versions of the theory, it is important to 
recognise that simplification eliminates certain issues by pre-determining the relevant 
decisions. 
 
 The first restriction assumes away the issue of R&D location. 
 The second assumes away off-shoring of production for the local market. 
Licensing production for the home market is also ruled out. 
 The third rules out subcontracting and franchising, leaving licensing as the 
only alternative to internalisation.  
 The fourth assumes that licensing involves just a single integrated licensee that 
undertakes both production and marketing  
 The fifth assumes that a foreign licensee does not produce in the home country 
to serve the foreign market. 
 
Because of these assumptions, simple versions of the theory are unable to analyse 
some important questions. In fact, these assumptions are quite unnecessary   
in order to solve the model. The full model is perfectly soluble; indeed, under certain 
conditions it can be solved in three simple stages. The conditions require that there are 
constant returns to scale in production and that local product markets are independent 
of each other. These conditions ensure that ownership and location decisions for each 
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market depend only on the location of R&D and are independent of decisions made 
for other markets. 
 
The three-stage procedure is as follows.  
1. Optimise internalisation decisions for each market conditional on the location 
of production for that market and the location of R&D. Thereby determine the 
minimum cost of serving each market under each location strategy given 
optimal internalisation decisions; this summary information is used in stage 2 
 
2. Optimise the location of production for each market conditional on the 
location of R&D. Assume that the optimal internalisation strategy is used in 
each market (as determined in stage 1). Thereby derive the minimum cost of 
serving each market conditional on R&D location, with optimal production 
location and internalisation decisions. Determine the profit generated by each 
market conditional on the location of R&D; this information is used in stage 3. 
Hence determine whether it is profitable to serve each market.    
 
3. Optimise the location of R&D, given that, conditional on R&D location, each 
profitable market is served in an optimal way. 
 
The profitability of serving individual markets depends on consumer demand as well 
as on cost of supply. Profit is readily calculated when demand in each market is a 
linear function of price, or when there is a uniform reservation price and fixed market 
size.  
 
5.3. Decision trees 
 
The solution described above can be illustrated using the decision tree shown in 
Figure 2. Each strategic option is represented by a vertical line. The tree has five 
levels. The decisions at any level are conditional on decisions made at a higher level. 
Decisions are represented by branching points in the tree where different roots 
diverge. These branch points are illustrated by solid circles. Each decision assumes 
that lower level decisions have already been optimised. To keep the tree simple, all 
the decisions involve binary choices; two-tiered binary decisions are equivalent to a 
single four-way decision, and so on. 
 
High-level decisions concern unitary activities, where a single facility occupies a 
single location (in this case R&D), while low-level decisions concern replicable 
activities, where the same activity (in this case production and marketing) may be 
performed at different locations. Replication is indicated by a point with a ‘plus sign’ 
inside a circle. These are the points at which decisions bi-furcate, with localised 
decisions at lower levels being independent of each other. 
 
5.4. Decentralisation of decision-making  
 
Decisions relating to each replicable facility depend only on decisions taken with 
respect to unitary facilities (R&D). Decisions related to replicable activities can 
therefore be decentralised to the facilities concerned. Each market has a local manager 
appointed by headquarters. This manager obtains quotes for wholesale product supply 
from alternative producers at different locations, and compares them with ‘do-it-
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yourself’ internal production costs at these same locations. They also solicit bids from 
local licensees and franchisees, and compare these bids with the profit that could be 
obtained from ‘do-it-yourself’ local marketing. The quotes are then adjusted for 
differential transport costs, contractual costs and other costs incurred. The optimal 
market-sourcing decision is then determined by maximising the profit generated by 
the market. 
 
Each local manager communicates their profit estimate to headquarters. This quote is 
conditional on R&D location, since this determines the knowledge transfer costs 
incurred in production.  Headquarters then determines the optimal location of R&D 
by comparing the net profit contribution of alternative R&D locations, taking account 
of access to supply of local skills, the advantages of co-location with headquarters, 
and other relevant factors. Once R&D location has been determined, the decision is 
communicated to local managers and they implement local arrangements. 
 
At the appropriate stage a local manager may decide not to serve a market, or 
headquarters may decide not to carry out R&D; there is no incentive for the firm to 
undertake any activity that makes a loss.   
 
Decentralisation effects a division of labour in coordination. Different people are 
responsible for different stages of decision-making. Global decisions about R&D are 
taken at headquarters by people with global vision, who synthesise and interpret 
summary information supplied by local managers from across the world. Local 
decisions are taken by local managers who have access to local information that 
headquarters staff lack. Centralisation, by contrast, requires headquarters staff to 
process detailed information from many locations without much knowledge of the 
local context from which it has been supplied. 
 
Although the IB literature has discussed decentralisation at great length, the logical 
structure of decision-making revealed by decision-tree analysis is rarely mentioned. 
This logical structure depends on the nature of production and marketing, and in 
particular the strength of local market inter-dependencies and economies of scale. 
Other factors are important too. Decentralisation is most advantageous when 
information is highly localised and communication costs are high. Since 
communication costs increase with speed, this implies that decentralisation is 
favoured when decision-making need to be quick. This discussion demonstrates that 
questions of subsidiary autonomy are closely connected with the logical structure of 
system-wide optimisation. It suggests, more generally, that the organisational 
structure of the MNE can be understood as a rational response to the logical structure 
of internal problem-solving.   
 
5.5. Families of decision trees 
 
The systems view, as its name suggests, comprises a whole family of models of the 
kind discussed above. Different research questions call for different variants of the 
model above. Additional markets, production locations and contractual options can all 
be introduced but there is no point in adding to complexity unless the questions asked 
demand it. 
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The systems view can be expanded into an entire suite of models, each useful for a 
different purpose. The logical properties of each model will stem from the structure of 
its decision tree. The decision–tree is a ‘fingerprint’ of the model, which uniquely 
identifies each model and highlights its important properties in symbolic form.    
 
By exploring the IB field in a systematic way it is possible, in principle, to identify a 
list of key questions that the system approach should address. A family of models can 
then be developed, tailored to the needs of specific questions. In principle there exists 
an encompassing model, or ‘super-model’, that includes all of these specific models 
as special cases. A solution of the super-model permits the solution of each specific 
model by to be derived from simplifying restrictions imposed on the super-model 
solution. The development of the super-model requires specialised modelling 
capabilities. It is an intellectual activity rather than a practitioner activity. To motivate 
the pursuit of such activity as a route to career advancement, the professional culture 
of IB studies may need to change. 
 
6. The industry view 
 
6.1. Interactions between firms 
 
The systems view emphasises the interaction of decisions within a single firm. But 
many decisions involve interactions between firms. Firms can either compete or co-
operate, or combine elements of the two. Competition may stem from direct imitation 
or the development of new rival technologies, while co-operation may involve 
mergers or joint ventures. What is really required, therefore, is a systems view of the 
industry. The systems view of the firm would then be embedded within this wider 
view. 
 
The systems view of the industry is not merely a view of the industry through the eyes 
of a firm within it, but rather a detached ‘bird’s eye’ view from the standpoint of the 
academic or policy-maker. No individual firm is of special interest from this view, 
unless they possess significant monopoly power. 
 
In IB studies a global industry is usually viewed as an oligopoly, comprising a small 
number of leading firms and a competitive fringe of smaller firms. The small firms 
may be recent entrants striving to gain market share, or declining firms pursuing a 
long-run exit strategy. It is important, however, to recognise the role of licensees, 
franchisees and subcontractors within this industry view. In the systems view of the 
firm, set out above, such firms play only a relatively passive role. They compete for 
contracts with knowledge-intensive firms, but they are not regarded as knowledge-
intensive themselves. While they possess local knowledge, they have no monopoly of 
it, and therefore supply their knowledge on competitive terms. A comprehensive 
industry view must recognise that these firms may possess knowledge advantages of 
their own and therefor possess market power.    
 
6.2. Mapping the structure of an industry 
 
Both neoclassical theory and early Coasian theory is that they take an industry-level 
view rather than a firm-level view of the economy. In neoclassical theory production 
decisions made by other firms interact with consumer demand to determine the 
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competitive price to which the firm responds. In Coasian theory each firm is bounded 
by other firms, and its boundaries are fixed through interaction with these firms. 
 
Neither neoclassical theory nor Coasian theory provides a fully satisfactory account of 
the industry environment, however. Neoclassical theory typically assumes that there 
are many small identical perfectly competitive firms. Coasian theory postulates 
heterogeneous firms operating in imperfect markets, but it rules out proprietary 
knowledge. A satisfactory account of industry structure must be based on a systems 
view of the firm as set out above. It would distinguish between production, marketing, 
R&D and headquarters. It would also take a modular view of production. It would 
identify the location and ownership of each facility: the production plants, distribution 
centres, R&D laboratories and headquarters offices. These locations would be 
mapped in relation to major centres of product demand.  Flows of products and 
services would be indicated, including flows of knowledge, semi-processed products, 
final products, and coordinating information. 
 
Two sets of boundaries would be drawn on the map. The first would be political 
boundaries identifying different countries. The second would be ownership 
boundaries, indicating the boundaries between different firms. MNEs would exist 
where ownership boundaries encompassed political boundaries. 
 
Ownership boundaries would be of two main kinds. Some boundaries would intersect 
linkages, indicating an arm’s length contract between two firms. Boundaries that 
intersected flows of R&D would correspond to licensing, subcontracting and 
franchising arrangements in which an innovative firm supplies knowledge to an 
ordinary firm possessing relevant local knowledge. Boundaries that intersected flows 
of semi-processed product flows would correspond to vertical disintegration in multi-
stage production. 
 
Other boundaries would separate firms that had no linkages at all. These firms would 
typically be competitors, operating rival production systems based on different 
variants of proprietary knowledge. 
 
6.3. A systems view of an industry 
 
The challenge facing theory is then to explain why the map takes the specific form it 
does. There are many possible configurations, but only one reflects reality at any 
given time. Theory needs to possess some principle that selected the actual 
configuration from all the possibilities. 
 
The most significant difference between industry analysis and firm analysis in IB is 
the requirement in industry analysis to analyse interactions between different 
knowledge-intensive firms. Some interactions may be negotiated, such as mergers and 
joint ventures. These involve contractual arrangements that can be analysed using 
methods similar to those employed above. Competitive interactions, however, do not 
involve negotiated contracts but mainly rival investments based on conjectures about 
how rival firms will act and react.  
 
There are two main approaches to modelling interactions of this kind. The first 
regards interaction as a real-time process and industry outcomes over time, while the 
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second regards interaction as a virtual process that results in an equilibrium outcome 
at a given point in time. The first approach is associated with behavioural models of 
industry dynamics and the second with the theory of games. Neither approach is 
entirely satisfactory. 
 
Industry dynamics are usually modelled by postulating simple decision rules followed 
by firms, and tracking their interactions over time. The results are sensitive to 
assumed initial conditions, and the sequence in which firms are allowed to move. 
Sophisticated models incorporate learning, so that decision rules are modified over 
time. In the long run quick learners tend to profit at the expense of slow learners 
leading to total dominance by the fastest learners. In practice, however, high speeds of 
learning are difficult to sustain. Speed of learning is a characteristic of the 
entrepreneur who heads the firm and takes the key decisions; it is a quality that is 
difficult to perpetuate through personal succession, or to fully embed in the culture of 
a firm. Realistic models of industry dynamics need to address the issue of 
entrepreneurial recruitment, retention and succession, but no model has successfully 
implemented this approach so far. 
 
The theory of non-co-operative games analyses strategic interactions between rivals. 
It assumes that interaction is a virtual process in which firms make conjectures about 
each other’s behaviour. There are two main variants: in the first the firms act 
simultaneously and in the second they act sequentially. 
 
Simultaneous decisions. Firms consider every possible scenario that could result from 
other firm’s behaviours and calculate correctly what their best response would be in 
each case. Each firm then independently identifies the set of all scenarios in which 
each firm, including themselves, will respond in the appropriate way given the other 
firm’s behaviours. This is an equilibrium set, in the sense that for any scenario in this 
set no firm will regret the decision it has made given what it observes that the other 
firms have done.   If there is a single equilibrium scenario there is a unique outcome 
in which each firm behaves in a definite way. If there is no equilibrium scenario then 
there is no predicted outcome; if there are several equilibria then it is assumed that 
one of them will appear, although the logic behind this assumption is unclear. 
 
Sequential decisions. With sequential decision-making each firm acts in turn. Each 
firm can predict correctly how other firms will react to their decision, and to the 
decisions already made by other firms. This gives an advantage to the first mover, 
because through their decision they can influence, within limits, how following firms 
will react. The sequence must be specified in advance (as in behavioural models). One 
way of doing this is to assume that the most entrepreneurial firms act first, and the 
least entrepreneurial last.   
 
From a pragmatic perspective, all three approaches can be used and their predictions 
compared on a case-by-case basis. In then becomes possible to tinker with the best-
performing theory to improve its fit with the evidence. A useful starting point for 
analysing industry competition would be IB theories of oligopoly that were developed 
in the 1970s and have been largely neglected since. For industry co-operation, 
theories of international joint ventures, firm co-location and agglomeration are an 
obvious starting point.   
 
 19 
6.4. Factors influencing the boundaries of firms in a global industry 
 
Industry analysis can be used to generalise the systems view of the firm set out 
earlier. An industry outcome, however determined, predicts which firms will innovate 
and which will not; which firms will serve which national markets, where they will 
locate headquarters, R&D and production, whether they will license, subcontract or 
franchise when serving specific markets. As a bonus, the theory can also predict 
prices in each market, quantity sold, revenues, costs and profits. If firms innovate with 
perfect foresight then all firms that innovate will break even or make a profit, and all 
firms that do not innovate would not have made a profit if that they innovated as well. 
 
In terms of the map discussed above, the solution obtained from the industry analysis 
identifies all the points and all the boundaries on the map. Industry outcomes can take 
many different forms, giving many possible configurations of firms. Which 
configuration prevails at any given time depends, in general, on the state of the global 
economy and the state of each global industry in particular. Figure 3 identifies some 
of the major factors influencing industry outcomes. The factors are derived from the 
discussion in earlier sections of this paper. 
 
The analysis can also be used to compare the different types of configurations that are 
likely to emerge in different types of global industry (Spender’s (1989) ‘industry 
recipes’). It can also explain the nature and direction of these changes. Changes in 
exogenous factors in the industry environment will induce endogenous changes in 
firm behaviour, thereby re-drawing the boundaries between firms as they adapt to new 
industry conditions. Competitive forces may stimulate entry and exit, thereby 
changing the population of firms as a whole. 
 
Systems theory applied to IB theory is not a theory of any particular type of MNE. 
‘US’, ‘European’, Chinese’ and ‘emerging market’ MNEs simply represent different 
outcomes of industry interaction, conditioned by the industry environment prevailing 
at any given time.  It is a general theory, as noted above, and it is unnecessary to 
develop special theories every time circumstances change.    
 
7. Multi-level analysis 
 
The range of topics encompassed by modern IB studies is impressive but their sheer 
diversity raises the question of how they are related. The usual answer is that they 
focus on different functional areas of the firm, and employ different methods of 
analysis, but are united by a focus on international issues. The theory set out above 
suggests another way of categorising the literature, however, namely by level of 
analysis.  
 
Table 4 identifies five levels of analysis commonly found in IB studies. Higher levels 
of analysis typically involve greater aggregation. The preceding analysis is embedded 
in the middle level levels of this analysis, which means that there is an opportunity to 
both raise and lower the level of analysis. The table indicates what this would mean in 
practice.  
 The highest level of analysis relates to the global economy. It concerns 
patterns of trade flow, FDI flow and knowledge flow between major countries. 
It features trading blocs and international institutions. 
 20 
 The next level disaggregates the global economy into global industries. 
Although certain industries predominate in IB literature – automobiles, 
pharmaceuticals, computers, textile, etc. - this level includes all major sectors 
including many different types of services. 
 Global industries comprise a large collection of firms, including MNEs, their 
partners (licensees, franchisees, subcontractors, etc.) their rivals, joint venture 
partners and so on; they also include many small firms of a purely national 
character. Firm-level studies typically focus on innovation strategies and 
headquarters-subsidiary relations. The interface between the firm level and the 
industry level is a key issue in IB theory, as noted above. 
 The modular view of the firm identifies different types of activity carried out 
in different types of establishments – production plants, wholesale 
warehouses, retail outlets, R&D laboratories and so on.  These specialised 
activities, and the establishments in which they are carried out, can be 
examined separately. This creates specialised sub-fields, such as international 
marketing and innovation management. Modularisation may extend to the 
sub-division of plants in multi-stage production and multi-tier supply chains; 
this is linked to supply chain management. Modularisation may also be 
applied to administrative activities. Headquarters may comprise separate legal, 
financial, and strategy departments.  In some cases headquarters may be 
distributed across a network of different locations, with legal located in a tax 
haven, financial close to a major stock market and strategic at a global 
communications hub. The internal coordination of specialised establishment 
focused on specific functional areas creates another level of analysis. While 
firm-level analysis typically focuses on inter-plant coordination within a 
multi-plant firm, this level of analysis focuses on intra-plant coordination 
instead.  
 The lowest level of analysis, corresponding to the highest level of 
disaggregation, focuses on individual people. These are typically employees – 
usually managers, but sometimes workers too. The selection, training and 
retention of key employees are crucial to the success of the firm. Yet this level 
of analysis is often detached from mainstream IB research and treated 
separately as international human resource management.  Furthermore, it is 
often forgotten that many key decisions in a firm are taken by entrepreneurs – 
people who specialise in taking judgemental decisions involve the 
commitment of large resources under conditions of great uncertainty. People 
matter not only because the strategies of a firm impact on many people – 
customers, suppliers and shareholders as well as employees. People matter 
because it is people that take the key decisions that determine strategy. The 
firm is an institution – a legal construct – and does not have a mind of its own. 
The minds that determine strategies are the minds of individual entrepreneurs, 
such as the founder, CEO or principal personal shareholder of the firm. 
 
A key component of the research agenda for economic modelling in IB is to extend 
the previous theory to other levels of analysis. Extending upwards will allow the 
theory to inform debates about the future of the global economy. IB scholarship is 
often marginalised in policy debates about global futures because its high-level theory 
is under-developed, and extending the system view to this level would help to resolve 
this problem. Extending downwards to the individual level would emphasise the role 
of personal characteristics in firm performance, and counter a tendency in current 
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literature to assume that firms and not people are the principal actors in IB. It would 
also advance understanding of the role of teamwork in coordinating individual action 
within the firm.     
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper has set out an agenda for economic modelling in IB. Economic modelling 
provides a degree of relevance and intellectual rigour that other forms of theorising 
cannot match. MNEs are fundamentally economic organisations, allocating scarce 
resources internally in order to compete against rival firms. They are complex 
organisations operating in a complex environment, and formal models are therefore 
required to clarify the inter-dependencies within and between firms. 
 
Good models are based on a small set of explicit assumptions from which a range of 
distinct but related hypotheses can be derived. The logic of such models can often be 
expressed most easily in mathematical terms. Mathematics is a language like any 
other; many IB scholars have mastered multiple languages, and it would be highly 
advantageous if they mastered mathematics too.    
 
Standard economic models are typical based on neoclassical assumptions.  IB models 
require that some neoclassical assumptions – perfect markets and free knowledge – 
are replaced by weaker assumptions – namely market imperfections and proprietary 
knowledge. Confusion between plants and firms must also be resolved: plants 
produce, firms coordinate, and the same firm can coordinate several plants. In a 
spatially distributed politically divided world, multi-plant coordination creates the 
MNE.    
 
Formal modelling must be based on secure foundations, and these foundations are 
provided by early IB theory. Later theory is too simplistic and wedded to a 
‘boardroom view’ of the firm. Classic internalisation theory was established in the 
1970s and extended in the 1990s by the ‘systems view’. Since then the pace of 
theoretical development has slowed, but there is now an opportunity to revive it, 
particularly as new economic methods, such as game theory, have become available.  
The systems view can be extended to the industry level, and additional levels of 
analysis can also be explored. By employing the same small set of assumptions at all 
levels of analysis, a coherent theory of IB will emerge that encompasses the many 
different fields covered by existing IB literature.      
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Table 1: Four key characteristics of post-1945: a comparison of neoclassical and 
IB explanations 
 
Evidence Neoclassical prediction IB theory explanation 
Direction of net flow: 
Investment flows mainly from 
US to UK 
Investment flows from low-
profit countries to high-profit 
countries 
US firms make high 
[monopoly] profits from 
proprietary technology. Most 
UK competitors do not possess  
such technology 
‘Cross-hauling’: There is also 
some UK investment in the 
US—often in the same 
industries  
Cross-investment is inefficient 
perfect international capital 
markets make and  impossible 
UK high-technology firms can 
invest in the US for the same 
reasons that US firms invest in 
the UK. It is efficient to share 
technologies wherever they are 
developed.  
Industrial bias. Flows are 
concentrated in specific 
industries 
Flows affects all industries 
equally, unless there are 
industry-specific government 
barriers 
Direct (majority equity) 
investment is different to 
indirect (portfolio) because it 
confers control. Control is 
required mainly to protect 
knowledge transfer, which is 
highest in technology– and 
marketing-intensive industries.  
Time profile. Gross investment 
flows increase steadily  
Investment flows are 
intermittent. They are once-for 
all stock adjustments.  
The flow of direct investment 
increases as technological 
innovation and brand 
innovation increase.  
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Table 2: Three key questions addressed by early IB theory 
 
Question  Answer Relevant economic theory 
Why did US firms locate 
production in the UK? 
‘Location advantage’: jump 
tariff barriers, eliminate 
transport costs, cheaper 
labour 
Classical theories of 
location and trade 
(Ricardian comparative 
advantage); economic 
geography (the interplay of 
transport costs and 
economics of scale) 
How could they compete 
against UK firms with 
better local knowledge?  
‘Ownership advantage’: 
they had a compensating 
advantage which could be 
transferred internationally: 
proprietary knowledge  
Monopoly and oligopoly 
theory 
Why did they not sell 
(license) theory advantage 
to UK firms? 
‘Internalisation advantage’: 
avoiding costs of arm’s 
length contracts due, e.g., to 
weak intellectual property 
rights (IPR) 
Institutions 
(coordination/transaction 
costs) and knowledge 
(public good) 
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Table 3: The theory of vertical integration: potential coordination failures in an 
intermediate product market linking upstream and downstream production 
activities 
 
Authors Problem to which internalisation may be the answer 
Various Duplication of inventory due to distrust between managers 
of different plants  
Arrow Missing contingent forward contracts in intermediate 
product markets inhibit inter-temporal coordination 
Warren-Boulton and 
others 
Economies of scale within multi-stage production generate 
monopoly/monopsony power which distorts intermediate 
product prices and hence factor-proportions at earlier 
and/or later stages of production   
Williamson Mark I Recurrent high-frequency contracts for intermediate 
product are costly to negotiate and enforce. 
Casson Quality control is difficult for a downstream buyer when 
the intermediate product is an ‘experience’ rather than 
‘inspection’ good. 
Williamson Mark II/ 
Klein Crawford & 
Alchian 
High sunk costs and bilateral lock-in within multi-stage 
production create ‘small-numbers’ bargaining problems 
between ‘opportunistic’ upstream and downstream plants 
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Table 4: Levels of analysis 
 
Level Type Description 
1 Global Economy Structural change driven by basic research, shrinking 
distance, environmental change, etc. 
2 Global industry Inter-firm competition and co-operation 
3 Firm Boundaries of the firm; interaction of ownership 
and location on production, marketing, R&D and 
headquarters  
4 Plant and office Intra-plant organisation, management procedures 
and working practices 
5 Personal Recruitment, retention and motivation of staff; 
personal relations with customers and suppliers 
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Downstream 
production/ 
Marketing and 
distribution 
Upstream 
production 
R&D Country 1 Country 2 
P1 
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P2 
D1 D2 
C1 C2 
Figure 1 
Interaction of production, marketing and R&D: Potential inter-modular 
linkages involving flows of intermediate products 
 
Key: Box: physical activity; Triangle: generating knowledge; Circle: generating 
local information. Lines: Black: product; Dark grey: knowledge; Light grey: 
information. Arrows: Direction of principal flow   
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Figure 2 
  
Decision tree for solution of system optimisation 
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Production and marketing ownership decisions: Left to right 
Full internalisation (FDI); Franchising; Subcontracting; Licensing to a single integrated licensee; 
‘Putting out’: subcontracting and franchising to separate firms 
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Global geographical fundamentals: 
coastlines, rivers, altitudes, climates, soils, 
etc. 
Environmental legacy of human activity: 
 Positive: infrastructure investment in 
transport, communications, urban 
utilities) 
 Negative: mining, pollution, climate 
change, species extinction, etc. 
  
  
Policy formation in individual nations 
Dominant nation (imperialist) decides 
policies: 
War or peace 
Autocracy or democracy 
Property rights are weak or strong 
Protection or free trade 
High tax/low tax 
  
Cultural legacy of human activity: 
Scientific knowledge base (technology) 
Morality and law (property rights) 
Languages 
Political institutions (nation state) 
Resource endowments at each location 
‘Logistical distances’ between locations 
State of technological know-how 
Education and skills at each location 
(labour productivity, managerial 
competence) 
Costs of communication between 
locations 
Degrees of trust between locations 
  
 
Tariffs and taxes 
Local tastes and preferences 
Local costs of enforcement 
‘Political distances’ between nations 
Political 
process 
Figure 3: Factors in the industry environment 
General factors Specific factors appearing in the 
industry model 
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